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Merge crypto into configmanager
This commit is contained in:
Jarrod Johnson
parent
fc7d426d06
commit
cf7ffe9de2
@ -31,7 +31,18 @@
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# - Passphrase protected (requiring human interaction every restart)
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# - TPM sealing (which would forgo the interactive assuming risk of
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# physical attack on TPM is not a concern)
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# This module provides cryptographic convenience functions, largely to be
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# used by config.py to protect/unlock configuration as appropriopriate.
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# The default behavior provides no meaningful protection, all encrypted
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# values are linked to a master key that is stored in the clear.
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# meanigful protection comes when the user elects to protect the key
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# by passphrase and optionally TPM
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import Crypto.Protocol.KDF as kdf
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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from Crypto.Hash import HMAC
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from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
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import array
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import ast
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import collections
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@ -49,6 +60,110 @@ import string
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import threading
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_masterkey = None
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_masterintegritykey = None
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def _derive_keys(passphrase, salt):
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#implement our specific combination of pbkdf2 transforms to get at
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#key. We bump the iterations up because we can afford to
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tmpkey = kdf.PBKDF2(passphrase, salt, 32, 50000,
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lambda p, s: HMAC.new(p, s, SHA256).digest())
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finalkey = kdf.PBKDF2(tmpkey, salt, 32, 50000,
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lambda p, s: HMAC.new(p, s, SHA256).digest())
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return (finalkey[:32],finalkey[32:])
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def _get_protected_key(keydict, passphrase):
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if keydict['unencryptedvalue']:
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return keydict['unencryptedvalue']
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# TODO(jbjohnso): check for TPM sealing
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if 'passphraseprotected' in keydict:
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if passphrase is None:
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raise Exception("Passphrase protected secret requires passhrase")
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for pp in keydict['passphraseprotected']:
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salt = pp[0]
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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return decrypt_value(pp[1:], key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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else:
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raise Exception("No available decryption key")
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def _format_key(key, passphrase=None):
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if passphrase is not None:
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salt = os.urandom(32)
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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cval = crypt_value(key, key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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return {"passphraseprotected": cval}
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else:
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return {"unencryptedvalue": key}
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def init_masterkey(passphrase=None):
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global _masterkey
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global _masterintegritykey
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cfgn = configmanager.get_global('master_privacy_key')
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if cfgn:
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_masterkey = _get_protected_key(cfgn, passphrase=passphrase)
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else:
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_masterkey = os.urandom(32)
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configmanager.set_global('master_privacy_key', _format_key(
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_masterkey,
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passphrase=passphrase))
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cfgn = configmanager.get_global('master_integrity_key')
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if cfgn:
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_masterintegritykey = _get_protected_key(cfgn, passphrase=passphrase)
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else:
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_masterintegritykey = os.urandom(64)
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configmanager.set_global('master_integrity_key', _format_key(
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_masterintegritykey,
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passphrase=passphrase))
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def decrypt_value(cryptvalue,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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iv, cipherdata, hmac = cryptvalue
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if _masterkey is None or _masterintegritykey is None:
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init_masterkey()
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check_hmac = HMAC.new(_masterintegritykey, cipherdata, SHA256).digest()
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if hmac != check_hmac:
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raise Exception("bad HMAC value on crypted value")
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decrypter = AES.new(_masterkey, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
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value = decrypter.decrypt(cipherdata)
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padsize = ord(value[-1])
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pad = value[-padsize:]
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# Note that I cannot grasp what could be done with a subliminal
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# channel in padding in this case, but check the padding anyway
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for padbyte in pad:
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if ord(padbyte) != padsize:
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raise Exception("bad padding in encrypted value")
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return value[0:-padsize]
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def crypt_value(value,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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# encrypt given value
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# PKCS7 is the padding scheme to employ, if no padded needed, pad with 16
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# check HMAC prior to attempting decrypt
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if key is None or integritykey is None:
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init_masterkey()
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key=_masterkey
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey
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iv = os.urandom(16)
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crypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
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neededpad = 16 - (len(value) % 16)
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pad = chr(neededpad) * neededpad
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value = value + pad
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cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value)
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hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cryptval, SHA256).digest()
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return (iv, cryptval, hmac)
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def is_tenant(tenant):
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try:
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@ -182,8 +297,7 @@ def _decode_attribute(attribute, nodeobj, formatter=None, decrypt=False):
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return nodeobj[attribute]
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elif 'cryptvalue' in nodeobj[attribute] and decrypt:
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retdict = copy.deepcopy(nodeobj[attribute])
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retdict['value'] = crypto.decrypt_value(
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nodeobj[attribute]['cryptvalue'])
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retdict['value'] = decrypt_value(nodeobj[attribute]['cryptvalue'])
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return retdict
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return nodeobj[attribute]
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@ -355,8 +469,7 @@ class ConfigManager(object):
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self._sync_groups_to_node(node=node,
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groups=attribmap[node]['groups'])
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if 'value' in newdict and attrname.startswith("secret."):
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newdict['cryptvalue' ] = \
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crypto.crypt_value(newdict['value'])
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newdict['cryptvalue' ] = crypt_value(newdict['value'])
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del newdict['value']
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cfgobj[attrname] = newdict
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if ('_expressionkeys' in cfgobj and
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@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
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# IBM(c) 2013
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# This module provides cryptographic convenience functions, largely to be
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# used by config.py to protect/unlock configuration as appropriopriate.
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# The default behavior provides no meaningful protection, all encrypted
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# values are linked to a master key that is stored in the clear.
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# meanigful protection comes when the user elects to protect the key
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# by passphrase and optionally TPM
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import array
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import confluent.config.configmanager as configmanager
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import math
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import os
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import Crypto.Protocol.KDF as kdf
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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from Crypto.Hash import HMAC
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from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
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_masterkey = None
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_masterintegritykey = None
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def _derive_keys(passphrase, salt):
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#implement our specific combination of pbkdf2 transforms to get at
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#key. We bump the iterations up because we can afford to
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tmpkey = kdf.PBKDF2(passphrase, salt, 32, 50000,
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lambda p, s: HMAC.new(p, s, SHA256).digest())
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finalkey = kdf.PBKDF2(tmpkey, salt, 32, 50000,
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lambda p, s: HMAC.new(p, s, SHA256).digest())
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return (finalkey[:32],finalkey[32:])
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def _get_protected_key(keydict, passphrase):
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if keydict['unencryptedvalue']:
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return keydict['unencryptedvalue']
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# TODO(jbjohnso): check for TPM sealing
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if 'passphraseprotected' in keydict:
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if passphrase is None:
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raise Exception("Passphrase protected secret requires passhrase")
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for pp in keydict['passphraseprotected']:
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salt = pp[0]
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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return decrypt_value(pp[1:], key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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else:
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raise Exception("No available decryption key")
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def _format_key(key, passphrase=None):
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if passphrase is not None:
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salt = os.urandom(32)
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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cval = crypt_value(key, key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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return {"passphraseprotected": cval}
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else:
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return {"unencryptedvalue": key}
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def init_masterkey(passphrase=None):
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global _masterkey
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global _masterintegritykey
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cfgn = configmanager.get_global('master_privacy_key')
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if cfgn:
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_masterkey = _get_protected_key(cfgn, passphrase=passphrase)
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else:
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_masterkey = os.urandom(32)
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configmanager.set_global('master_privacy_key', _format_key(
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_masterkey,
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passphrase=passphrase))
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cfgn = configmanager.get_global('master_integrity_key')
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if cfgn:
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_masterintegritykey = _get_protected_key(cfgn, passphrase=passphrase)
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else:
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_masterintegritykey = os.urandom(64)
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configmanager.set_global('master_integrity_key', _format_key(
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_masterintegritykey,
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passphrase=passphrase))
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def decrypt_value(cryptvalue,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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iv, cipherdata, hmac = cryptvalue
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if _masterkey is None or _masterintegritykey is None:
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init_masterkey()
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check_hmac = HMAC.new(_masterintegritykey, cipherdata, SHA256).digest()
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if hmac != check_hmac:
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raise Exception("bad HMAC value on crypted value")
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decrypter = AES.new(_masterkey, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
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value = decrypter.decrypt(cipherdata)
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padsize = ord(value[-1])
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pad = value[-padsize:]
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# Note that I cannot grasp what could be done with a subliminal
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# channel in padding in this case, but check the padding anyway
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for padbyte in pad:
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if ord(padbyte) != padsize:
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raise Exception("bad padding in encrypted value")
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return value[0:-padsize]
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def crypt_value(value,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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# encrypt given value
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# PKCS7 is the padding scheme to employ, if no padded needed, pad with 16
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# check HMAC prior to attempting decrypt
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if key is None or integritykey is None:
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init_masterkey()
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key=_masterkey
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey
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iv = os.urandom(16)
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crypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
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neededpad = 16 - (len(value) % 16)
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pad = chr(neededpad) * neededpad
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value = value + pad
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cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value)
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hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cryptval, SHA256).digest()
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return (iv, cryptval, hmac)
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