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Split out crypt stuff into it's own file
This commit is contained in:
Jarrod Johnson
parent
71e1607b57
commit
dc8c9d091c
@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ import math
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import os
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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from Crypto.Hash import HMAC
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from Crypto.Hash import SHA25sterkey = None
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_masterintegritykey = None
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_cfgstore = {}
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@ -102,125 +99,6 @@ def _expand_expression(attribute, nodeobj):
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pass
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def unlock_config_keys(passphrase=None):
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_init_masterkey(passphrase)
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def _pbkdf2(passphrase, salt, iterations, size):
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blocks = int(math.ceil(size/32.0)) # Hardcoded to SHA256 behavior
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retkey = ""
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for block in xrange(blocks):
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citerations = iterations
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tsalt = salt + chr(block)
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currval = HMAC.new(passphrase, tsalt, SHA256).digest()
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currarray = array.array('L',currval)
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while citerations > 1:
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currval = HMAC.new(passphrase, currval).digest()
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nextarray = array.array('L',currval)
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for index in range(nextarray):
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currarray[index] = currarray[index] ^ nextarray[index]
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currval = currarray.tostring()
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currarray = nextarray
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citerations = citerations - 1
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retkey += currval
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return retkey[:size]
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def _derive_keys(passphrase, salt):
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tmpkey = _pbkdf2(passphrase, salt, 50000, 32)
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finalkey = _pbkdf2(tmpkey, salt, 50000, 96)
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return (finalkey[:32],finalkey[32:])
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def _get_protected_key(keydict, passphrase):
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if keydict['unencryptedvalue']:
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return keydict['unencryptedvalue']
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# TODO(jbjohnso): check for TPM sealing
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if 'passphraseprotected' in keydict:
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if passphrase is None:
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raise Exception("Passphrase protected secret requires passhrase")
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for pp in keydict['passphraseprotected']:
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salt = pp[0]
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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return _decrypt_value(pp[1:], key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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else:
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raise Exception("No available decryption key")
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def _format_key(key, passphrase=None):
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if passphrase is not None:
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salt = os.urandom(32)
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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cval = _crypt_value(key, key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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return {"passphraseprotected": cval}
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else:
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return {"unencryptedvalue": key}
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def _init_masterkey(passphrase=None):
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if 'master_privacy_key' in _cfgstore['globals']:
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_masterkey = _get_protected_key(
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_privacy_key'],
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passphrase=passphrase)
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else:
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_masterkey = os.urandom(32)
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_privacy_key'] = _format_key(_masterkey,
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passphrase=passphrase)
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if 'master_integrity_key' in _cfgstore['globals']:
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_masterintegritykey = _get_protected_key(
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_integrity_key'],
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passphrase=passphrase
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)
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else:
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_masterintegritykey = os.urandom(64)
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_integrity_key'] = _format_key(
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_masterintegritykey,
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passphrase=passphrase
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)
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def _decrypt_value(cryptvalue,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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iv, cipherdata, hmac = cryptvalue
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if _masterkey is None or _masterintegritykey is None:
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_init_masterkey()
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check_hmac = HMAC.new(_masterintegritykey, cryptvalue, SHA256).digest()
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if hmac != check_hmac:
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raise Exception("bad HMAC value on crypted value")
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decrypter = AES.new(_masterkey, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
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value = decrypter.decrypt(cryptvalue)
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padsize = ord(value[-1])
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pad = value[-padsize:]
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# Note that I cannot grasp what could be done with a subliminal
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# channel in padding in this case, but check the padding anyway
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for padbyte in pad:
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if ord(padbyte) != padsize:
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raise Exception("bad padding in encrypted value")
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return value[0:-padsize]
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def _crypt_value(value,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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# encrypt given value
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# PKCS7 is the padding scheme to employ, if no padded needed, pad with 16
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# check HMAC prior to attempting decrypt
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if key is None or integritykey is None:
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_init_masterkey()
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key=_masterkey
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey
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iv = os.urandom(16)
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crypter = AES.new(key, ASE.MOD_CBC, iv)
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neededpad = 16 - (len(value) % 16)
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pad = chr(neededpad) * neededpad
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value = value + pad
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cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value)
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hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cryptval, SHA256).digest()
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return (iv, cryptval, hmac)
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class NodeAttribs(object):
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def __init__(self, nodes=[], attributes=[], tenant=0):
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self._nodelist = collecitons.dequeue(nodes)
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139
confluent/cryptutils.py
Normal file
139
confluent/cryptutils.py
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
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# IBM(c) 2013
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# This module provides cryptographic convenience functions, largely to be
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# used by config.py to protect/unlock configuration as appropriopriate.
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# The default behavior provides no meaningful protection, all encrypted
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# values are linked to a master key that is stored in the clear.
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# meanigful protection comes when the user elects to protect the key
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# by passphrase and optionally TPM
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import array
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import math
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import os
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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from Crypto.Hash import HMAC
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from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
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_masterkey = None
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_masterintegritykey = None
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def unlock_config_keys(passphrase=None):
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_init_masterkey(passphrase)
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def _pbkdf2(passphrase, salt, iterations, size):
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blocks = int(math.ceil(size/32.0)) # Hardcoded to SHA256 behavior
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retkey = ""
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for block in xrange(blocks):
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citerations = iterations
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tsalt = salt + chr(block)
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currval = HMAC.new(passphrase, tsalt, SHA256).digest()
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currarray = array.array('L',currval)
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while citerations > 1:
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currval = HMAC.new(passphrase, currval).digest()
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nextarray = array.array('L',currval)
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for index in range(len(nextarray)):
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currarray[index] = currarray[index] ^ nextarray[index]
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currval = currarray.tostring()
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currarray = nextarray
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citerations = citerations - 1
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retkey += currval
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return retkey[:size]
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def _derive_keys(passphrase, salt):
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tmpkey = _pbkdf2(passphrase, salt, 50000, 32)
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finalkey = _pbkdf2(tmpkey, salt, 50000, 96)
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return (finalkey[:32],finalkey[32:])
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def _get_protected_key(keydict, passphrase):
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if keydict['unencryptedvalue']:
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return keydict['unencryptedvalue']
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# TODO(jbjohnso): check for TPM sealing
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if 'passphraseprotected' in keydict:
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if passphrase is None:
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raise Exception("Passphrase protected secret requires passhrase")
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for pp in keydict['passphraseprotected']:
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salt = pp[0]
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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return _decrypt_value(pp[1:], key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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else:
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raise Exception("No available decryption key")
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def _format_key(key, passphrase=None):
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if passphrase is not None:
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salt = os.urandom(32)
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privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(passphrase, salt)
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cval = _crypt_value(key, key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
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return {"passphraseprotected": cval}
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else:
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return {"unencryptedvalue": key}
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def _init_masterkey(passphrase=None):
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if 'master_privacy_key' in _cfgstore['globals']:
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_masterkey = _get_protected_key(
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_privacy_key'],
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passphrase=passphrase)
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else:
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_masterkey = os.urandom(32)
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_privacy_key'] = _format_key(_masterkey,
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passphrase=passphrase)
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if 'master_integrity_key' in _cfgstore['globals']:
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_masterintegritykey = _get_protected_key(
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_integrity_key'],
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passphrase=passphrase
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)
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else:
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_masterintegritykey = os.urandom(64)
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_cfgstore['globals']['master_integrity_key'] = _format_key(
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_masterintegritykey,
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passphrase=passphrase
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)
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def _decrypt_value(cryptvalue,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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iv, cipherdata, hmac = cryptvalue
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if _masterkey is None or _masterintegritykey is None:
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_init_masterkey()
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check_hmac = HMAC.new(_masterintegritykey, cryptvalue, SHA256).digest()
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if hmac != check_hmac:
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raise Exception("bad HMAC value on crypted value")
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decrypter = AES.new(_masterkey, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
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value = decrypter.decrypt(cryptvalue)
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padsize = ord(value[-1])
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pad = value[-padsize:]
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# Note that I cannot grasp what could be done with a subliminal
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# channel in padding in this case, but check the padding anyway
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for padbyte in pad:
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if ord(padbyte) != padsize:
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raise Exception("bad padding in encrypted value")
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return value[0:-padsize]
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def _crypt_value(value,
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key=_masterkey,
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey):
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# encrypt given value
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# PKCS7 is the padding scheme to employ, if no padded needed, pad with 16
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# check HMAC prior to attempting decrypt
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if key is None or integritykey is None:
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_init_masterkey()
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key=_masterkey
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integritykey=_masterintegritykey
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iv = os.urandom(16)
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crypter = AES.new(key, ASE.MOD_CBC, iv)
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neededpad = 16 - (len(value) % 16)
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pad = chr(neededpad) * neededpad
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value = value + pad
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cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value)
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hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cryptval, SHA256).digest()
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return (iv, cryptval, hmac)
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