diff --git a/confluent_server/confluent/config/configmanager.py b/confluent_server/confluent/config/configmanager.py
index 0d1f8284..341e817f 100644
--- a/confluent_server/confluent/config/configmanager.py
+++ b/confluent_server/confluent/config/configmanager.py
@@ -145,10 +145,13 @@ def _parse_key(keydata, password=None):
if keydata.startswith('*unencrypted:'):
return base64.b64decode(keydata[13:])
elif password:
- salt, iv, crypt, hmac = [base64.b64decode(x)
+ cryptbits = [base64.b64decode(x)
for x in keydata.split('!')]
+ salt, iv, crypt, hmac = cryptbits[:4]
privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(password, salt)
- return decrypt_value([iv, crypt, hmac], privkey, integkey)
+ if len(cryptbits) > 4:
+ integkey = None
+ return decrypt_value(cryptbits[1:], privkey, integkey)
raise(exc.LockedCredentials(
"Passphrase protected secret requires password"))
@@ -157,7 +160,7 @@ def _format_key(key, password=None):
if password is not None:
salt = os.urandom(32)
privkey, integkey = _derive_keys(password, salt)
- cval = crypt_value(key, key=privkey, integritykey=integkey)
+ cval = crypt_value(key, key=privkey) # , integritykey=integkey)
return {"passphraseprotected": (salt,) + cval}
else:
return {"unencryptedvalue": key}
@@ -348,7 +351,7 @@ def init_masterkey(password=None, autogen=True):
if cfgn:
_masterkey = _get_protected_key(cfgn, password, 'master_privacy_key')
elif autogen:
- _masterkey = os.urandom(32)
+ _masterkey = os.urandom(16)
set_global('master_privacy_key', _format_key(
_masterkey,
password=password))
@@ -356,11 +359,11 @@ def init_masterkey(password=None, autogen=True):
if cfgn:
_masterintegritykey = _get_protected_key(cfgn, password,
'master_integrity_key')
- elif autogen:
- _masterintegritykey = os.urandom(64)
- set_global('master_integrity_key', _format_key(
- _masterintegritykey,
- password=password))
+ #elif autogen:
+ # _masterintegritykey = os.urandom(64)
+ # set_global('master_integrity_key', _format_key(
+ # _masterintegritykey,
+ # password=password))
def _push_rpc(stream, payload):
@@ -373,25 +376,34 @@ def _push_rpc(stream, payload):
def decrypt_value(cryptvalue,
key=None,
integritykey=None):
- iv, cipherdata, hmac = cryptvalue
+ # for future reference, if cryptvalue len == 3, then cbc+hmac, 4 includes version
+ iv, cipherdata, hmac = cryptvalue[:3]
if key is None and integritykey is None:
- if _masterkey is None or _masterintegritykey is None:
+ if _masterkey is None:
init_masterkey(autogen=False)
key = _masterkey
integritykey = _masterintegritykey
- check_hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cipherdata, SHA256).digest()
- if hmac != check_hmac:
- raise Exception("bad HMAC value on crypted value")
- decrypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
- value = decrypter.decrypt(cipherdata)
- padsize = ord(value[-1])
- pad = value[-padsize:]
- # Note that I cannot grasp what could be done with a subliminal
- # channel in padding in this case, but check the padding anyway
- for padbyte in pad:
- if ord(padbyte) != padsize:
- raise Exception("bad padding in encrypted value")
- return value[0:-padsize]
+ if len(cryptvalue) == 3:
+ check_hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cipherdata + iv, SHA256).digest()
+ if hmac != check_hmac:
+ check_hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cipherdata, SHA256).digest()
+ if hmac != check_hmac:
+ raise Exception("bad HMAC value on crypted value")
+ decrypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
+ value = decrypter.decrypt(cipherdata)
+ padsize = ord(value[-1])
+ pad = value[-padsize:]
+ # Note that I cannot grasp what could be done with a subliminal
+ # channel in padding in this case, but check the padding anyway
+ for padbyte in pad:
+ if ord(padbyte) != padsize:
+ raise Exception("bad padding in encrypted value")
+ return value[0:-padsize]
+ else:
+ decrypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=iv)
+ value = decrypter.decrypt(cipherdata)
+ decrypter.verify(hmac)
+ return value
def fixup_attribute(attrname, attrval):
@@ -443,22 +455,32 @@ def crypt_value(value,
# encrypt given value
# PKCS7 is the padding scheme to employ, if no padded needed, pad with 16
# check HMAC prior to attempting decrypt
- if key is None or integritykey is None:
- if _masterkey is None or _masterintegritykey is None:
+ hmac = None
+ if key is None:
+ if _masterkey is None:
init_masterkey()
key = _masterkey
integritykey = _masterintegritykey
- iv = os.urandom(16)
- crypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
- neededpad = 16 - (len(value) % 16)
- pad = chr(neededpad) * neededpad
- value += pad
- try:
- cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value)
- except TypeError:
- cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value.encode('utf-8'))
- hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cryptval, SHA256).digest()
- return iv, cryptval, hmac
+ if integritykey:
+ iv = os.urandom(16)
+ crypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC, iv)
+ neededpad = 16 - (len(value) % 16)
+ pad = chr(neededpad) * neededpad
+ value += pad
+ try:
+ cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value)
+ except TypeError:
+ cryptval = crypter.encrypt(value.encode('utf-8'))
+ hmac = HMAC.new(integritykey, cryptval + iv, SHA256).digest()
+ return iv, cryptval, hmac
+ else:
+ iv = os.urandom(12)
+ crypter = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, nonce=iv)
+ try:
+ cryptval, hmac = crypter.encrypt_and_digest(value)
+ except TypeError:
+ cryptval, hmac = crypter.encrypt_and_digest(value.encode('utf-8'))
+ return iv, cryptval, hmac, '\x02'
def _load_dict_from_dbm(dpath, tdb):
@@ -2427,7 +2449,7 @@ def _restore_keys(jsond, password, newpassword=None, sync=True):
def _dump_keys(password, dojson=True):
- if _masterkey is None or _masterintegritykey is None:
+ if _masterkey is None:
init_masterkey()
cryptkey = _format_key(_masterkey, password=password)
if 'passphraseprotected' in cryptkey:
@@ -2436,14 +2458,16 @@ def _dump_keys(password, dojson=True):
else:
cryptkey = '*unencrypted:{0}'.format(base64.b64encode(
cryptkey['unencryptedvalue']))
- integritykey = _format_key(_masterintegritykey, password=password)
- if 'passphraseprotected' in integritykey:
- integritykey = '!'.join(map(base64.b64encode,
- integritykey['passphraseprotected']))
- else:
- integritykey = '*unencrypted:{0}'.format(base64.b64encode(
- integritykey['unencryptedvalue']))
- keydata = {'cryptkey': cryptkey, 'integritykey': integritykey}
+ keydata = {'cryptkey': cryptkey}
+ if _masterintegritykey is not None:
+ integritykey = _format_key(_masterintegritykey, password=password)
+ if 'passphraseprotected' in integritykey:
+ integritykey = '!'.join(map(base64.b64encode,
+ integritykey['passphraseprotected']))
+ else:
+ integritykey = '*unencrypted:{0}'.format(base64.b64encode(
+ integritykey['unencryptedvalue']))
+ keydata['integritykey'] = integritykey
if dojson:
return json.dumps(keydata, sort_keys=True, indent=4, separators=(',', ': '))
return keydata