2022-03-08 19:46:00 +00:00
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/* Copyright 2019-2021 Lenovo */
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#include "sha-256.h"
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <crypt.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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#include <netdb.h>
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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#include <sys/time.h>
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#define MAXPACKET 1024
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2023-01-19 19:53:35 +00:00
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static const char cryptalpha[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789./";
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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unsigned char* genpasswd(int len) {
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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unsigned char * passwd;
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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int urandom, ret;
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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passwd = calloc(len + 1, sizeof(char));
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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urandom = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
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2022-02-17 22:05:00 +00:00
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if (urandom < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Failed reading /dev/urandom\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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ret = read(urandom, passwd, len);
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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close(urandom);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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for (urandom = 0; urandom < len; urandom++) {
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passwd[urandom] = cryptalpha[passwd[urandom] >> 2];
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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}
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2022-02-17 22:05:00 +00:00
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passwd[len] = 0; // Should be redundant with calloc, but be explicit
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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return passwd;
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}
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2022-03-10 14:00:54 +00:00
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char * b64e(uint8_t * data, uint32_t datalen) {
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uint8_t * currptr;
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uint8_t * currout;
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uint8_t currchunk[4];
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uint8_t * retval;
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uint32_t neededlen;
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int32_t remaining = datalen;
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neededlen = (datalen - 1) / 3 * 4 + 4;
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retval = malloc(neededlen + 1);
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currout = retval;
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currptr = data;
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currchunk[3] = 0;
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while (remaining > 0) {
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currchunk[0] = currptr[0];
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currchunk[1] = remaining > 1 ? currptr[1] : 0;
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currchunk[2] = remaining > 2 ? currptr[2] : 0;
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currptr += 3;
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currout[0] = cryptalpha[currchunk[0] >> 2];
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currout[1] = cryptalpha[(currchunk[0] << 4 | currchunk[1] >> 4) & 0x3f];
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currout[2] = remaining > 1 ? cryptalpha[(currchunk[1] << 2 | currchunk[2] >> 6) & 0x3f] : '=';
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currout[3] = remaining > 2 ? cryptalpha[currchunk[2] & 0x3f] : '=';
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remaining -= 3;
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currout += 4;
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}
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retval[neededlen] = 0;
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return retval;
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}
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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int getpasshmac(int argc, char* argv[]) {
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FILE *outfile;
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uint8_t *passwd;
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uint8_t *buffer;
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uint8_t *tmps;
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uint8_t *cryptpass;
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uint8_t hmac[32];
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2022-03-10 14:00:54 +00:00
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uint8_t *hmac64;
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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uint8_t hmackey[64];
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int hmackeysize;
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if (argc < 5) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s passfile cryptfile hmacfile hmackey\n", argv[0]);
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exit(1);
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}
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outfile = fopen(argv[4], "r");
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hmackeysize = fread(hmackey, 1, 64, outfile);
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fclose(outfile);
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passwd = genpasswd(48);
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outfile = fopen(argv[1], "w");
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buffer = malloc(20);
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tmps = genpasswd(16);
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memcpy(buffer, "$5$", 3);
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memcpy(buffer + 3, tmps, 16);
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Tweak various issues for static analysis.
For autocons, though it's copying from a static source, use strncpy anyway,
despite the length being hardcoded already. This makes static analysis happier.
Terminate the buff with a NULL. This is superfluous as the strcpies that preceed
are guaranteed to null terminate, or exit the program.
In clortho, free(tmps), which is a valid leak, though clortho isn't long running.
Also, explicitly return 0, which is ultimately returned by main().
Static analysis could not figure out that padneeded implies that keylen is short of
chunk size, so change the check to be expressly the scenario that static analysis
was worried about directly, rather than indirectly.
Hint to static analysis that we don't care about the time as a time value by masking the
lower 32 bit explicitly. This was already happening, but static analysis was afraid
that we wanted this as time instead of just some mutating value.
2022-12-06 20:35:49 +00:00
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free(tmps);
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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buffer[19] = 0;
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fwrite(passwd, 1, 48, outfile);
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fclose(outfile);
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cryptpass = crypt(passwd, buffer);
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outfile = fopen(argv[2], "w");
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fwrite(cryptpass, 1, strlen(cryptpass), outfile);
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fclose(outfile);
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hmac_sha256(hmac, cryptpass, strlen(cryptpass), hmackey, hmackeysize);
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2022-03-10 14:15:26 +00:00
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hmac64 = b64e(hmac, 32);
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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outfile = fopen(argv[3], "w");
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2022-03-10 14:00:54 +00:00
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fwrite(hmac64, 1, strlen(hmac64), outfile);
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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fclose(outfile);
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2022-03-10 14:00:54 +00:00
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free(hmac64);
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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free(passwd);
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free(buffer);
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Tweak various issues for static analysis.
For autocons, though it's copying from a static source, use strncpy anyway,
despite the length being hardcoded already. This makes static analysis happier.
Terminate the buff with a NULL. This is superfluous as the strcpies that preceed
are guaranteed to null terminate, or exit the program.
In clortho, free(tmps), which is a valid leak, though clortho isn't long running.
Also, explicitly return 0, which is ultimately returned by main().
Static analysis could not figure out that padneeded implies that keylen is short of
chunk size, so change the check to be expressly the scenario that static analysis
was worried about directly, rather than indirectly.
Hint to static analysis that we don't care about the time as a time value by masking the
lower 32 bit explicitly. This was already happening, but static analysis was afraid
that we wanted this as time instead of just some mutating value.
2022-12-06 20:35:49 +00:00
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return 0;
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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}
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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int sock, ret;
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2020-05-04 21:27:22 +00:00
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char slen;
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2020-11-06 15:00:36 +00:00
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unsigned char currtype;
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size_t currlen;
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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unsigned char* passwd;
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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unsigned char* cryptedpass;
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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unsigned char* macaddr;
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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struct timeval timeout;
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struct addrinfo hints;
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struct addrinfo *addrs;
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struct addrinfo *curr;
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struct sockaddr_in net4bind;
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2020-03-02 21:06:07 +00:00
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struct sockaddr_in6 net6bind;
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2022-03-08 19:46:00 +00:00
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FILE *hmackeyfile;
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uint8_t hmackey[64];
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uint8_t hmac[32];
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int hmackeysize = 0;
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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unsigned char buffer[MAXPACKET];
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
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memset(&net4bind, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
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2020-03-02 21:06:07 +00:00
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memset(&net6bind, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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memset(&buffer, 0, MAXPACKET);
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memset(&timeout, 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
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2022-03-09 18:36:47 +00:00
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if (strstr(argv[0], "genpasshmac") != NULL) {
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return getpasshmac(argc, argv);
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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timeout.tv_sec = 10;
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net4bind.sin_port = htons(302);
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2020-06-19 14:24:51 +00:00
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net4bind.sin_family = AF_INET;
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2020-03-02 21:06:07 +00:00
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net6bind.sin6_port = htons(302);
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net6bind.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
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hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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passwd = genpasswd(32);
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memset(buffer, 0, MAXPACKET);
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strncpy(buffer, "$5$", 3);
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cryptedpass = genpasswd(8);
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strncpy(buffer + 3, cryptedpass, 8);
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free(cryptedpass);
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cryptedpass = crypt(passwd, buffer);
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2020-02-27 21:36:16 +00:00
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if (argc < 3) {
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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fprintf(stderr, "Missing node name and manager\n");
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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exit(1);
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}
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2022-03-08 19:46:00 +00:00
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if (argc == 4) {
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hmackeyfile = fopen(argv[3], "r");
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hmackeysize = fread(hmackey, 1, 64, hmackeyfile);
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fclose(hmackeyfile);
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hmac_sha256(hmac, cryptedpass, strlen(cryptedpass), hmackey, hmackeysize);
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}
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2020-02-27 21:36:16 +00:00
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sock = getaddrinfo(argv[2], "13001", &hints, &addrs);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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if (sock != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Error trying to resolve %s\n", argv[2]);
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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exit(1);
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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for (curr = addrs; curr != NULL; curr = curr->ai_next) {
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sock = socket(curr->ai_family, curr->ai_socktype, curr->ai_protocol);
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if (sock < 0) continue;
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2022-02-17 22:05:00 +00:00
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if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &(int){1}, sizeof(int)) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Failed setting reusaddr\n");
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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if (curr->ai_family == AF_INET) {
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2021-04-28 12:37:23 +00:00
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if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&net4bind, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Unable to bind port 302\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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} else if (curr->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
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2021-04-28 12:37:23 +00:00
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if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr*)&net6bind, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Unable to bind port 302\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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} else {
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continue;
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}
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if (connect(sock, curr->ai_addr, curr->ai_addrlen) == 0) break;
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}
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if (curr == NULL) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Unable to reach %s\n", argv[2]);
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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exit(1);
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}
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2022-02-17 22:05:00 +00:00
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if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Unable to set timeout\n");
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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freeaddrinfo(addrs);
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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ret = read(sock, buffer, 8);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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if (memcmp(buffer, "\xc2\xd1-\xa8\x80\xd8j\xba", 8) != 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized server\n");
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exit(1);
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}
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2020-05-04 21:27:22 +00:00
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slen = strlen(argv[1]) & 0xff;
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dprintf(sock, "\x01%c%s", slen, argv[1]);
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2022-03-08 19:46:00 +00:00
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if (hmackeysize) {
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ret = write(sock, "\x06\x20", 2);
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ret = write(sock, hmac, 32);
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} else
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ret = write(sock, "\x00\x00", 2);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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memset(buffer, 0, MAXPACKET);
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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ret = read(sock, buffer, 2);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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while (buffer[0] != 255) {
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currtype = buffer[0];
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2020-11-06 15:00:36 +00:00
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if (currtype & 0b10000000) {
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2020-11-06 18:38:37 +00:00
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currlen = buffer[1] << 8;
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2021-06-03 21:05:54 +00:00
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while (read(sock, buffer, 1) < 0) {};
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2020-11-06 18:38:37 +00:00
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currlen |= buffer[0];
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2020-11-06 15:00:36 +00:00
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} else {
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currlen = buffer[1];
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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memset(buffer, 0, MAXPACKET);
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2020-11-06 15:00:36 +00:00
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if (currlen > 1000) {
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fprintf(stderr, "Received oversized message\n");
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2022-02-17 22:05:00 +00:00
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exit(1);
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2020-11-06 15:00:36 +00:00
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}
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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if (currlen) {
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2020-11-06 15:00:36 +00:00
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ret = read(sock, buffer, currlen); // Max is 1000, well under MAX_PACKET
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2020-11-06 18:57:35 +00:00
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buffer[currlen] = 0;
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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}
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if (currtype == 2) {
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2021-06-04 21:19:19 +00:00
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dprintf(sock, "\x03%c", (int)currlen);
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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ret = write(sock, buffer, currlen);
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2020-05-04 21:27:22 +00:00
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slen = strlen(cryptedpass) & 0xff;
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dprintf(sock, "\x04%c%s", slen, cryptedpass);
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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ret = write(sock, "\x00\x00", 2);
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2020-11-06 15:00:36 +00:00
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} else if (currtype == 128) {
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2022-02-17 22:05:00 +00:00
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printf("SEALED:%s", buffer);
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printf("\n");
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exit(0);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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} else if (currtype == 5) {
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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printf("%s", passwd);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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printf("\n");
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exit(0);
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}
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buffer[0] = 255;
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2020-05-04 14:22:04 +00:00
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ret = read(sock, buffer, 2);
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2019-08-09 20:43:48 +00:00
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}
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fprintf(stderr, "Password was not accepted\n");
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exit(1);
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2019-08-08 20:14:05 +00:00
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}
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