arif/xcat-core
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Milestone for powershell client code, can now add the CA and successfully verify server:

Browse Source 
PS R:\pst> import-module .\xCAT.psd1
PS R:\pst> Import-xCATCA .\ca-cert.pem
PS R:\pst> Connect-xCAT odin 3001
PS R:\pst>
(commit best reviewed while listening to O Fortuna)

git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/xcat/code/xcat-core/trunk@15539 8638fb3e-16cb-4fca-ae20-7b5d299a9bcd
This commit is contained in:
jbjohnso
2013-03-15 21:12:53 +00:00
parent 7eaed897e8
commit c602006c04
2 changed files with 22 additions and 18 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

BIN
xCAT-server/share/xcat/netboot/windows/xCAT.psd1
View File

Binary file not shown.

40
xCAT-server/share/xcat/netboot/windows/xCAT.psm1
View File

@@ -1,35 +1,36 @@
# IBM(c) 2013 EPL license http://www.eclipse.org/legal/epl-v10.html
# This function specifically validates that the peer we are talking to is signed by the xCAT blessed CA and no other CA
Function Approve-xCATCert ($sender, $cert, $chain, $polerrs) {
if ($polerrs -ne "None") { return $false } #if the overall policy suggests rejection, go with it
#now, system policy suggests that everything is ok, but we want to be more picky, because we
#are measuring something more specific than 'did any old CA sign this', we specifically want to assue the signer CA is xCAT's
#TODO: perhaps ignore the RemoteCertificateChainErrors condition and chase a chain of our own creation
#that chain could live outside the user or system wide root to avoid giving xCAT the power to sign certs for things it shouldn't
Function VerifyxCATCert ($sender, $cert, $chain, $polerrs) {
if ($polerrs -ne "None" -and $polerrs -ne "RemoteCertificateChainErrors") { return $false } #if the overall policy suggests rejection, go with it
#why do we tolerate RemoteCertificateChainErrors? Because we are going to check specifically for the CA configured for this xCAT installation
#we chose not to add xCAT's CA to the root store, as that implies the OS should trust xCAT's CA for non-xCAT related things. That is madness.
#Of course, that's the madness typical with x509, but we need not propogate the badness...
#we are measuring something more specific than 'did any old CA sign this', we specifically want to assue the signer CA is xCAT's
foreach ($cert in $chain.chainElements) {
if ($script:xcatcacert.thumbprint -eq $cert.Certificate.thumprint) {
if ($script:xcatcacert.thumbprint.Equals($cert.Certificate.thumbprint)) {
return $true
}
}
return $false
}
#we import the xCAT certificate authority into the appropriate scope
#we have to use localmachine in order to avoid interactive prompt, meaning we need admin for this one, besides
#this means admin installs CA cert for everyone
#TODO: use cert:\currentuser\root when not administrator to facilitate xCAT-client case, take the prompt once
#we import the xCAT certificate authority into the appropriate scope.
#It's not trusted by system policy, but our overidden verify function will find it. Too bad MS doesn't allow us custom store names under the user
#repository for whatever reason. We'll just 'import' it every session from file, which is harmless to do multiple times
#this isn't quite as innocuous as the openssl mechanisms to do this sort of thing, but it's as close as I could figure to get
Function Import-xCATCA ( $certpath ) {
$script:xcatcacert=Import-Certificate -FilePath $certpath -CertStoreLocation Cert:\LocalMachine\root
$script:xcatcacert=Import-Certificate -FilePath $certpath -CertStoreLocation Cert:\CurrentUser\My
}
#this removes the xCAT CA from trust store, if user wishes to explicitly distrust xCAT post deploy
#this removes the xCAT CA from trust store, if user wishes to explicitly remove xCAT key post deploy
#A good idea for appliances that want to not show weird stuff. The consequences of not calling it are harmless: a useless extra public cert
#in admin's x509 cert store
Function Remove-xCATCA ( $certpath ) {
xCAT-Import-CA($certpath) #this seems insane, but it's easiest way to make sure we have the correct path
Import-xCATCA($certpath) #this seems insane, but it's easiest way to make sure we have the correct path
rm $script:xcatcacert.PSPath
}
#specify a client certificate to use in pfx format
#we put this one in the user's store instead of system wide
Function Set-xCATClientCertificate ( $pfxPath ) {
$script:xcatclientcert=Import-pfxCertificate $pfxPath -certStoreLocation cert:\currentuser\my
}
@@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ Function Remove-xCATClientCertificate( $pfxPath ) {
#key here is that we might have two certificates:
#-one intended to identify the system that was deployed by xcat
#-one intended to identify the user to do things like 'rpower'
#TODO: argument to specify whether this is a human or machine. Default would be human and machine invocation would be in scripts
#however, user will just have to control it by calling Set-xCATClientCertificate on the file for now
#TODO: if user wants password protected PFX file, we probably would want to import it once and retain thumb across sessions...
Function Select-xCATClientCert ($sender, $targetHost, $localCertificates, $remoteCertificate,$acceptableIssuers) {
$script:xcatclientcert
}
@@ -52,6 +54,8 @@ Function Connect-xCAT {
$mgtServerAltName=$mgtServer
)
$script:xcatconnection = New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient($mgtServer,$mgtServerPort)
$script:verifycallback = Get-Content Function:\Appve-xCATCert
$script:xcatstream = $script:xcatconnection
$script:verifycallback = Get-Content Function:\VerifyxCATCert
$script:xcatstream = $script:xcatconnection.GetStream()
$script:securexCATStream = New-Object System.Net.Security.SSLStream($script:xcatstream,$false,$script:verifycallback)
$script:securexCATStream.AuthenticateAsClient($mgtServerAltName)
}