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# IBM(c) 2007 EPL license http://www.eclipse.org/legal/epl-v10.html
#-------------------------------------------------------
= head1
Plugin to handle credentials with good old fashioned priveleged port / host based authentication
May also include xCAT state - sensitive denial / allow
Also controlled by policy table ( SECURITY: must document how to harden and make more convenient
through policy table ) .
This sounds horrible and most of the time it would be . However , when dealing with unattended
installs , it is better than nothing . Apache does not appear to be able to give credence to
privileged ports vs . non - privileged ports on the client , so simple nfs - style authentication is
not possible .
The problem with more secure methods and unattended installs is that all rely upon the client to
have a blessed credential , and giving that credential or blessing a credential I can ' t think of a
way to feasibly do unattended truly securely , so here we try to mitigate the exposure and
implement nfs - like security ( with the plus of encryption , hopefully )
Supported command:
getcredentials
= cut
#-------------------------------------------------------
package xCAT_plugin::credentials ;
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use strict ;
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use xCAT::Table ;
use Data::Dumper ;
use xCAT::NodeRange ;
use IO::Socket::INET ;
use Time::HiRes qw( sleep ) ;
use xCAT::Utils ;
use xCAT::MsgUtils ;
use Getopt::Long ;
#-------------------------------------------------------
= head3 handled_commands
Return list of commands handled by this plugin
= cut
#-------------------------------------------------------
sub handled_commands
{
return { getcredentials = > "credentials" } ;
}
#-------------------------------------------------------
= head3 process_request
Process the command
= cut
#-------------------------------------------------------
my $ callback ;
sub process_request
{
my $ request = shift ;
$ callback = shift ;
my $ command = $ request - > { command } - > [ 0 ] ;
my $ args = $ request - > { arg } ;
my $ envs = $ request - > { env } ;
my $ client ;
#Because clients may be stuck with stunnel, we cannot presume they
#can explicitly bind to a low port number as a client
#unless ($request and $request->{'_xcat_clientport'} and $request->{'_xcat_clientport'}->[0] and $request->{'_xcat_clientport'}->[0] < 1000) {
# print Dumper($request);
# return; #only accept requests from privileged ports
#}
if ( $ request - > { '_xcat_clienthost' } ) {
$ client = $ request - > { '_xcat_clienthost' } - > [ 0 ] ;
}
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my $ rsp ;
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# do your processing here
# return info
if ( $ client ) { ( $ client ) = noderange ( $ client ) } ;
unless ( $ client ) { #Not able to do host authentication, abort
return ;
}
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my $ credcheck ;
if ( $ request - > { 'callback_port' } and $ request - > { 'callback_port' } - > [ 0 ] and $ request - > { 'callback_port' } - > [ 0 ] < 1024 ) {
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$ credcheck = [ 0 , $ request - > { 'callback_port' } - > [ 0 ] ] ;
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} elsif ( $ request - > { 'callback_https_port' } and $ request - > { 'callback_https_port' } - > [ 0 ] and $ request - > { 'callback_https_port' } - > [ 0 ] < 1024 ) {
$ credcheck = [ 1 , $ request - > { 'callback_https_port' } - > [ 0 ] ] ;
} else {
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return ;
}
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unless ( ok_with_node ( $ client , $ credcheck ) ) {
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return ;
}
my @ params_to_return = @ { $ request - > { arg } } ;
$ rsp - > { data } = [] ;
my $ tmpfile ;
my @ filecontent ;
my $ retdata ;
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my $ tfilename ;
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my $ root ;
if ( xCAT::Utils - > isAIX ( ) ) {
$ root = "" ;
} else {
$ root = "/root" ;
}
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foreach ( @ params_to_return ) {
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if ( /ssh_root_key/ ) {
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unless ( - r "$root/.ssh/id_rsa" ) {
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push @ { $ rsp - > { 'error' } } , "Unable to read root's private ssh key" ;
next ;
}
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$ tfilename = "$root/.ssh/id_rsa" ;
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} elsif ( /xcat_server_cred/ ) {
unless ( - r "/etc/xcat/cert/server-cred.pem" ) {
push @ { $ rsp - > { 'error' } } , "Unable to read root's private xCAT key" ;
next ;
}
$ tfilename = "/etc/xcat/cert/server-cred.pem" ;
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} elsif ( /xcat_client_cred/ or /xcat_root_cred/ ) {
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unless ( - r "$root/.xcat/client-cred.pem" ) {
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push @ { $ rsp - > { 'error' } } , "Unable to read root's private xCAT key" ;
next ;
}
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$ tfilename = "$root/.xcat/client-cred.pem" ;
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} elsif ( /ssh_dsa_hostkey/ ) {
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unless ( - r "/etc/xcat/hostkeys/ssh_host_dsa_key" ) {
push @ { $ rsp - > { 'error' } } , "Unable to read private DSA key from /etc/xcat/hostkeys" ;
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next ;
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}
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$ tfilename = "/etc/xcat/hostkeys/ssh_host_dsa_key" ;
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} elsif ( /ssh_rsa_hostkey/ ) {
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unless ( - r "/etc/xcat/hostkeys/ssh_host_rsa_key" ) {
push @ { $ rsp - > { 'error' } } , "Unable to read private RSA key from /etc/xcat/hostkeys" ;
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next ;
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}
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$ tfilename = "/etc/xcat/hostkeys/ssh_host_rsa_key" ;
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} elsif ( /xcat_cfgloc/ ) {
unless ( - r "/etc/xcat/cfgloc" ) {
push @ { $ rsp - > { 'error' } } , "Unable to read xCAT database location" ;
next ;
}
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$ tfilename = "/etc/xcat/cfgloc" ;
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} elsif ( /krb5_keytab/ ) { #TODO: MUST RELAY TO MASTER
my $ princsuffix = $ request - > { '_xcat_clientfqdn' } - > [ 0 ] ;
$ ENV { KRB5CCNAME } = "/tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$" ;
system ( 'kinit -S kadmin/admin -k -t /etc/xcat/krb5_pass xcat/admin' ) ;
system ( "kadmin -p xcat/admin -c /tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$ -q 'delprinc -force host/$princsuffix'" ) ;
system ( "kadmin -p xcat/admin -c /tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$ -q 'delprinc -force nfs/$princsuffix'" ) ;
system ( "kadmin -p xcat/admin -c /tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$ -q 'addprinc -randkey host/$princsuffix'" ) ;
system ( "kadmin -p xcat/admin -c /tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$ -q 'addprinc -randkey nfs/$princsuffix'" ) ;
unlink "/tmp/xcat/keytab.$$" ;
system ( "kadmin -p xcat/admin -c /tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$ -q 'ktadd -k /tmp/xcat/keytab.$$ nfs/$princsuffix'" ) ;
system ( "kadmin -p xcat/admin -c /tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$ -q 'ktadd -k /tmp/xcat/keytab.$$ host/$princsuffix'" ) ;
system ( "kdestroy -c /tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$" ) ;
unlink ( "/tmp/xcat/krb5cc_xcat_$$" ) ;
my $ keytab ;
open ( $ keytab , "/tmp/xcat/keytab.$$" ) ;
my $ tabdata = "\n" ;
my $ buf ;
require MIME::Base64 ;
while ( read ( $ keytab , $ buf , 1140 ) ) {
$ tabdata . = MIME::Base64:: encode_base64 ( $ buf ) ;
}
push @ { $ rsp - > { 'data' } } , { content = > [ $ tabdata ] , desc = > [ $ _ ] } ;
unlink "/tmp/xcat/keytab.$$" ;
next ;
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} elsif ( /x509cert/ ) {
my $ csr = $ request - > { 'csr' } - > [ 0 ] ;
my $ csrfile ;
my $ oldumask = umask 0077 ;
if ( - e "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) { unlink "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ; }
open ( $ csrfile , ">" , "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) ;
unless ( $ csrfile ) { next ; }
my @ statdat = stat $ csrfile ;
while ( $ statdat [ 4 ] != 0 or $ statdat [ 2 ] & 020 or $ statdat [ 2 ] & 002 ) { #try to be paranoid, root better own the file, and it better not be writable by anyone but owner
#this means to assure the filehandle is not write-accessible to others who may insert their malicious CSR
close ( $ csrfile ) ;
unlink ( "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) ;
open ( $ csrfile , ">" , "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) ;
@ statdat = stat $ csrfile ;
}
print $ csrfile $ csr ;
close ( $ csrfile ) ;
#ok, at this point, we can verify that the subject is one we wouldn't mind signing...
my $ subject = `openssl req -in /tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$ -subject -noout` ;
chomp ( $ subject ) ;
unless ( $ subject =~ /CN=$client\z/ ) { unlink ( "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) ; next ; }
unlink "/tmp/xcat/client.cert.$$" ;
open ( $ csrfile , ">" , "/tmp/xcat/client.cert.$$" ) ;
@ statdat = stat $ csrfile ;
while ( $ statdat [ 4 ] != 0 or $ statdat [ 2 ] & 020 or $ statdat [ 2 ] & 002 ) { #try to be paranoid, root better own the file, and it better not be writable by anyone but owner
#this prevents an attacker from predicting pid and pre-setting up a file that they can corrupt for DoS
close ( $ csrfile ) ;
unlink ( "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) ;
open ( $ csrfile , ">" , "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) ;
@ statdat = stat $ csrfile ;
}
close ( $ csrfile ) ;
open ( $ csrfile , "<" , "/etc/xcat/ca/index" ) ;
my @ caindex = <$csrfile> ;
close ( $ csrfile ) ;
foreach ( @ caindex ) {
chomp ;
my ( $ type , $ expiry , $ revoke , $ serial , $ fname , $ subject ) = split /\t/ ;
if ( $ type eq 'V' and $ subject =~ /CN=$client\z/ ) { #we already have a valid certificate, new request replaces it, revoke old
print "The time of replacing is at hand for $client\n" ;
system ( "openssl ca -config /etc/xcat/ca/openssl.cnf -revoke /etc/xcat/ca/certs/$serial.pem" ) ;
}
}
my $ rc = system ( "openssl ca -config /etc/xcat/ca/openssl.cnf -in /tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$ -out /tmp/xcat/client.cert.$$ -batch" ) ;
unlink ( "/tmp/xcat/client.csr.$$" ) ;
umask ( $ oldumask ) ;
if ( $ rc ) { next ; }
open ( $ csrfile , "<" , "/tmp/xcat/client.cert.$$" ) ;
my @ certdata = <$csrfile> ;
close ( $ csrfile ) ;
unlink "/tmp/xcat/client.cert.$$" ;
my $ certcontents = join ( '' , @ certdata ) ;
push @ { $ rsp - > { 'data' } } , { content = > [ $ certcontents ] , desc = > [ $ _ ] } ;
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} else {
next ;
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}
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#check if the file exists or not
if ( defined $ tfilename && - r $ tfilename ) {
open ( $ tmpfile , $ tfilename ) ;
@ filecontent = <$tmpfile> ;
close ( $ tmpfile ) ;
$ retdata = "\n" . join ( '' , @ filecontent ) ;
push @ { $ rsp - > { 'data' } } , { content = > [ $ retdata ] , desc = > [ $ _ ] } ;
$ retdata = "" ;
@ filecontent = ( ) ;
}
}
if ( defined $ rsp - > { data } - > [ 0 ] ) {
#if we got the data from the file, send the data message to the client
xCAT::MsgUtils - > message ( "D" , $ rsp , $ callback , 0 ) ;
} else {
#if the file doesn't exist, send the error message to the client
delete $ rsp - > { 'data' } ;
xCAT::MsgUtils - > message ( "E" , $ rsp , $ callback , 0 ) ;
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}
return ;
}
sub ok_with_node {
my $ node = shift ;
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#Here we connect to the node on a privileged port and ask the
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#node if it just asked us for credential. It's convoluted, but it is
#a convenient way to see if root on the ip has approved requests for
#credential retrieval. Given the nature of the situation, it is only ok
#to assent to such requests before users can log in. During postscripts
#stage in stateful nodes and during the rc scripts of stateless boot
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#This is about equivalent to host-based authentication in Unix world
#Generally good to move on to more robust mechanisms, but in an unattended context
#this proves difficult to do robustly.
#one TODO would be a secure mode where we make use of TPM modules to enhance in some way
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my $ select = new IO:: Select ;
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#sleep 0.5; # gawk script race condition might exist, try to lose just in case
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my $ parms = shift ;
my $ method = $ parms - > [ 0 ] ;
my $ port = $ parms - > [ 1 ] ;
if ( $ method == 0 ) { #PLAIN
my $ sock = new IO::Socket:: INET ( PeerAddr = > $ node ,
Proto = > "tcp" ,
PeerPort = > $ port ) ;
my $ rsp ;
unless ( $ sock ) { return 0 } ;
$ select - > add ( $ sock ) ;
print $ sock "CREDOKBYYOU?\n" ;
unless ( $ select - > can_read ( 5 ) ) { #wait for data for up to five seconds
return 0 ;
}
my $ response = <$sock> ;
chomp ( $ response ) ;
if ( $ response eq "CREDOKBYME" ) {
return 1 ;
}
} elsif ( $ method == 1 ) { #HTTPS
use LWP ;
use HTTP::Request::Common ;
my $ browser = LWP::UserAgent - > new ( ) ;
$ browser - > timeout ( 10 ) ;
$ SIG { ALRM } = sub { } ; #just need to interrupt the system call
alarm ( 10 ) ;
my $ response = $ browser - > request ( GET "https://$node:$port/" ) ;
alarm ( 0 ) ;
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if ( $ response - > is_success and $ response - > { '_content' } =~ /Ciphers supported in s_server binary/ ) {
#We are looking for openssl s_server running with -http, not settling for just any https response
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return 1 ;
}
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}
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return 0 ; #if here, something wrong happened, return false
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}
1 ;